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Abstract—The blockchain technology enables mutu-
ally untrusting participants to reach consensus on the
state of a distributed and decentralized ledger (called a
blockchain) in a permissionless setting. The consensus
protocol of the blockchain imposes a unified view of the
system state over the global network, and once a block
is stable in the blockchain, its data is visible to all users
and cannot be retrospectively modified or removed.
Due to these properties, the blockchain technology
is regarded as a general consensus infrastructure and
based on which a variety of systems have been built.
This article presents a study and survey of permis-
sionless blockchain systems in the context of secure
logging. We postulate the most essential properties
required by a secure logging system and by considering
a wide range of applications, we give insights into how
the blockchain technology matches these requirements.
Based on the survey, we motivate related research
perspectives and challenges for blockchain-based secure
logging systems, and we highlight potential solutions to
some specific problems.
I. Introduction and Background
Secure Logging. Logging is indispensable for many se-
cure IT systems. While there is no unanimous agreement
on the definition of a secure logging system, it can be re-
garded as a database system which securely keeps track of
records for security-critical data. A secure logging scheme
has a wide range of applications. It can be a stand-alone
system or an integral part of a larger system.
An event logging system is one traditional application of
secure logging. It records system events of forensic value in
a protected database. Such logging systems are security-
critical regular targets of sophisticated attackers trying to
eliminate their footprints. Therefore, it is important to
prevent unauthorized modifications and deletions of the
log entries. Timestamping service is an infrastructure used
to prove the existence of certain digital data prior to a
specific point in time. It is important to guarantee the
accuracy and validity of the timing information of data
and events, since its defect may have significant security
and financial implications. Therefore, the accuracy and
immutability of the timestamps are essential.
The security of many systems today is bootstrapped
from securely obtaining some specific authoritative infor-
mation. For example, a PKI is meaningless if the users
relying on it cannot obtain the correct certificates in the
first place [4], [28]. Another example are trusted directory
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servers [32], which when attacked can compromise prop-
erties of a relying infrastructure [24]. To address these
issues, transparency logs [8], [12], [18], [35] have been
proposed, which are services securely maintaining a list or
dictionary of objects. To prevent malicious entries from
being inserted into the log without being noticed, the
dictionary should be append-only. Moreover, participants
should have a singleton view of the dictionary, i.e., the log
should not be able to equivocate – this usually requires a
gossip protocol to be deployed [9], [25].
Desired Properties. From the example applications pre-
sented, we can extract a list of desired properties:
Availability: The logger can log artifacts without signif-
icant delays. For clients relying on the log server, all
logged artifacts and events can be accessed. Authenticity:
It should be verifiable who has created or submitted
the logged artifacts. Immutability: Once an artifact has
been logged, it cannot be altered or removed without
being noticed. Non-equivocation: All system participants
should have a unified view of the logs. The log server
cannot present different views of the log for different users.
Freshness: Some applications may demand the freshness
property, which allows to order the logged artifacts (weak
freshness) or even to determine the exact time of them up
to certain precision (strong freshness).
Blockchain and Secure Logging. Blockchain technolo-
gies, like Bitcoin [23] and Ethereum [37], are successful
beyond all expectations. This success is mainly driven by
their properties: consensus: all parties can (eventually)
agree on the current state of the system, transparency:
all transactions (of all participants) are visible to anyone,
irreversibility: blockchains have the append-only property
which implies that whenever a transaction is appended
to a blockchain it cannot be retrospectively modified
or removed, decentralization and openness: everyone can
participate in the system, and no centralized entity au-
thorizes participants or their transactions, availability: the
infrastructure is robust as it can tolerate a large fraction of
faulty participants. Due to these properties, the blockchain
technology enables novel applications like cryptocurrencies
and smart contracts. Even now, shortly after their advents,
these systems are successful and as a consequence of this
success developers and researchers try to reuse blockchain
infrastructures to build new or enhance existing systems.
A secure logging service based on decentralized
blockchain technology could have great potential and
could be deployed by multiple existing applications and
used for empowering novel ones. In fact, there are pro-
posals that try to use blockchain as a logging-related
service. For instance, blockchain-based timestamping [1],
2trusted record-keeping service [13], decentralized audit
systems [20], document signing infrastructures [16], times-
tamped commitments [10], or secure off-line payment sys-
tems [11]. Another line of research in this area is to design
transparency schemes based on blockchain technologies,
such as key transparency [5], certificate transparency [21],
[33], binary transparency [3], or log transparency [36].
Other related work includes providing legacy content (e.g.,
web content) to smart contracts [15], [27], [38].
However, there are many challenges associated with de-
signing and deploying such systems. In this work, we study
these systems, their logging-relevant properties, show their
limitations, and research opportunities.
II. Selected Blockchain Platforms
Bitcoin. Bitcoin [23] is the first and largest cryptocur-
rency and due to its open, distributed, decentralized na-
ture, and use of public-key cryptography, it offers (trans-
action) authenticity and a certain degree of availability.
The Bitcoin network maintains a distributed and repli-
cated ledger (i.e., blockchain) – an append-only linked
list of blocks (containing transactions). Since the system
is permissionless, any participant can vote her own view
of the current state by trying to append new blocks
to the blockchain. To combat Sybil attacks and reach
an agreement on the system state across the network,
Bitcoin employs the Nakamoto consensus where a solution
of a computational puzzle, serving as a Proof-of-Work
(PoW) must be presented to append a new block to the
blockchain. An incentive structure is embedded in the
protocol to encourage participants constantly competing
to put their own blocks onto the blockchain.
The global ledger is append-only, and once a block is
stable in the blockchain, its data cannot be retrospectively
modified or removed without significant computational
resources. Moreover, the whole network has a unified view
of the blockchain. These properties lead to a natural
way to build a secure logging system providing the non-
equivocation property, where we can record the log state-
ments on the blockchain. This can be done by sending
special transactions in the Bitcoin network. For example,
the OP RETURN code allows adding 220 Bytes of arbitrary
data to a transaction output.
Since every block of the Bitcoin blockchain has a times-
tamp, when recording data on the blockchain, it may be
tempted to use the same timestamp for the data. In prac-
tice, timestamps can differ radically from the actual time,
and they are susceptible to manipulation [6], [14], [34].
Hence, the accurate time cannot be determined and extra
caution must be taken when using the Bitcoin timestamps.
Bitcoin introduces the unspent transaction output (UTXO)
model where new transactions can spend only UTXOs
(i.e., actual coins) included in existing transactions. Bit-
coin introduces light SPV clients which can interact with
the blockchain without possessing and validating all blocks
(they store and validate only short block headers).
Ethereum. Ethereum [7] is a decentralized and open
replicated state machine whose state is maintained as
a PoW blockchain. Ethereum keeps track of a general-
purpose state which can be represented as a global dic-
tionary comprised by key-value pairs. The state transition
of Ethereum is processed by the so-called Ethereum virtual
machine executing code (called smart contract) written
in a Turing complete language. Ethereum introduces a
native cryptocurrency called ether and the notion of gas.
Ether is not only an integral part of the underlying PoW
based blockchain, but also intended as a utility currency
to purchase the gas that will be consumed when using the
system resources. This provides economic incentives and
security to the system.
Since Ethereum uses a similar consensus mechanism as
Bitcoin, any secure logging systems implemented based
on Bitcoin can also be realized over Ethereum, and they
can achieve similar properties with respect to availability,
authenticity, immutability and non-equivocation. More-
over, with Ethereum one can implement smart contracts
with almost arbitrary logic. Thus, compared to Bitcoin,
Ethereum is a more suitable choice if a logging service
requires actions or computations to be executed auto-
matically according to the current state and user inputs.
Finally, Ethereum provides a better freshness property
than Bitcoin, however, nodes of the Ethereum network rely
on the NTP [22] servers, and therefore their timestamps
are generated in a centralized way to some extent.
IOTA. There are multiple proposals aiming to improve
the efficiency of blockchain-based systems by deploying
directed acyclic graph (DAG) instead [19], [26], [29]–[31].
IOTA [26] is a permissionless distributed ledger where
transactions are stored in a data structure whose logical
topology forms a DAG. This design aspires to resolve some
inherent scalability issues of chain style blockchain and
positions itself as suitable for IoT applications.
In the IOTA terminology, the tangle is the data struc-
ture storing the distributed ledger, whose vertices are
called sites. Each site contains one transaction issued by
the IOTA user network. To be permanently attached to
the tangle and become one site, a transaction must directly
approve two existing transactions (sites) in the tangle. If
there is a path from site B to site A, we say that site A is
indirectly approved by site B. The genesis site is directly
or indirectly approved by all sites (excluding itself) in the
tangle. The tips are those sites that have not been ap-
proved by any site. Consequently, the chronological order
of two sites cannot be determined unless there is a path
connecting them. Thus even the weak freshness on dif-
ferent paths cannot be determined. In IOTA, anyone can
issue a data transaction with arbitrary content of about
1.27 KBytes. Though each transaction has a timestamp
field, it is not verified when the transaction is added to
the IOTA network which means this timestamp can be any
time with the correct format. Therefore, it is challenging
to build time-sensitive logging systems relying only upon
IOTA. Currently, the security of the IOTA network is
ensured by an entity called coordinator who verifies all
transactions, that is, a transaction cannot be a part of the
tangle without the coordinator’s approval. Consequently,
3TABLE I: Logging-Related Features of Selected Platforms.
tx arrival public-key publicly data timestamp data size data
Platforms time identities accessible structure range per tx recording
Bitcoin 10 min yes yes chain 2 h 220 Bytes OP RETURN
Ethereum 15 sec yes yes chain 15 s 780 KBytes smart contract
IOTA net. latency yes yes DAG ⊥ 1.27 KBytes message
Note that, in IOTA, there is no validity check of the timestamp; thus it can be arbitrary and we use ⊥ to represent it.
the community calls into question the (de)centralization
nature of IOTA, and we do not find any convincing
response from the IOTA Foundation.
III. Selected Blockchain-based Logging Systems
Namecoin. Namecoin is a decentralized key-value pairing
log system based on a Bitcoin hard fork [17] preserving
its main properties. Namecoin achieves human-readability,
strong ownership and decentralization for a naming log
system while no previous systems can provide both these
three properties. In Namecoin, a user registers a key-value
record on the blockchain by issuing a special transaction
containing the record. Once this transaction is included in
the blockchain, the record creation operation is done. This
record and owner address will be seen by every node in the
blockchain network. For updating the record, the owner
issues a transaction containing the updated information.
The initial motivation for Namecoin was to create an
alternative to DNS. The latency of creating and updating
records is capped by the Bitcoin’s consensus protocol,
and its average time is 60 minutes. The authentication
property is achieved by a pseud-anonymous address as
its identity. For freshness, Namecoin can prove the order
of the name-value records. However, the exact time of a
record cannot be guaranteed.
Commitcoin. Commitcoin [10] is a timestamped com-
mitment scheme based on Bitcoin. When the commitment
is opened, anyone can be convinced that the commitment
was made before a certain time. Assume that Alice is a
Bitcoin user with a key pair (sk,pk) who wants to make
a commitment of message m. Alice first computes the
commitment c of the message m with random number
r, and then derives a new key pair (sk′,pk′) with the
private key sk′ = c. Then Alice signs a Bitcoin transaction
τ1 which sends 2 bitcoins from pk to pk
′ with secret
key sk and randomness ρ, producing signature σ1. Alice
signs another transaction τ2 which send 1 bitcoin from pk
′
to pk with secret key sk′ and randomness ρ′, producing
signature σ2. The signed transactions are broadcast to the
Bitcoin network to be included in the public blockchain,
which proves that Alice knows the corresponding private
keys of pk and pk′. Alice can make the commitment
publicly available by signing a transaction τ3 which returns
the remaining 1 bitcoin from pk′ back to pk with secret key
sk′ and previously used randomness ρ′ and broadcasting
the resulting signature σ3 to the Bitcoin network. Note
that this operation effectively leaks sk′ = c to the public
since the same key and randomness are used to generate
the signatures σ2 and σ3 [10]. Finally, Alice can open the
commitment by announcing (m,r), and the timestamp of
the block containing τ1 indicates a rough time at which the
commitment was created. The accuracy of commitment
timestamps depends on Bitcoin timestamps.
Catena. Catena [36] is an efficient non-equivocation
scheme built on top of Bitcoin. A Catena log is boot-
strapped by issuing an initial transaction to the Bitcoin
blockchain called the genesis transaction. To issue the first
statement in the log associated with a genesis transaction,
Catena commits the statement s1 via an OP RETURN
transaction whose input is the UTXO of the genesis block.
Similarly, any subsequent log statement si+1 is embedded
in an OP RETURN transaction that spends the UTXO of
si, creating a chain of transactions with log statements
rooted at the genesis transaction. The statements are
verified against the genesis block. The resistance against
equivocation is as strong as that of Bitcoin, since incon-
sistent statement chains imply a double spending at some
point of the chain. Catena is an example of an application
inheriting the security of the underlying blockchain.
Contour. Contour [3] presents a proactive mechanism
for binary transparency. Contour is built on top of the
Bitcoin blockchain. Whenever the authority wants to issue
a package, it incorporates the hash value of each binary as
a leaf of a Merkle tree with root hb. Once the Merkle tree
reaches a threshold size, the authority issues a blockchain
transaction tx in which hb is embedded as one of the out-
put by using OP RETURN. Like in Catena [36], every such
transaction tx must spend a previous transaction output
that is spent by the authority. When a client requests
a software updating, accompanying with the requested
binary, two inclusion proofs which assert the binary has
been added in the log and is thus accessible to the monitor
are sent to the auditor. The proofs convince the auditor
that a) the relevant binary is included in the Merkle tree
represented by hb and b) the transaction tx is included in
the block. The authority cannot mutate nor equivocate a
published binary as long as the Bitcoin platform is secure.
Data Feed for Smart Contracts. Data feeds for smart
contract make off-chain data available for on-chain smart-
contract-based applications. Town Crier [38] relies on a
trusted execution environment (TEE) to implement a
service which contacts a content provider, verifies and
parses its data, and provides it to a smart contract on
demand. It does not involve the content provider in the
protocol, however, it requires trust in the TEE platform
used. TLS-N [27] provides a transport-layer approach,
where content providers can provide non-repudiation for
their application-layer data (e.g., HTTP). It is a more
general solution, however, it requires low-level protocol
changes and content providers must deploy the protocol.
PDFS [15] is an application-layer solution giving content
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Fig. 1: Categorization of blockchain-based secure logging systems.
providers smart contracts used to verify the authenticity
of their published content. In PDFS, off-chain data is
obtained from a content provider’s website and its identity
is authenticated by a TLS certificate. The scheme provides
a payment framework, non-equivocation, and censorship
evidence for content providers but it requires them to
deploy (only application-level changes are required).
IV. Research Perspectives and Challenges
Reliable Timestamps. Bitcoin timestamps may be inac-
curate. Thus, it is a valuable research topic to investigate
how to enhance the Bitcoin protocol with existing trusted
timestamping services, which can provide evidence that
a block is created within a sharper time interval. One
possible solution is that we can combine the timestamp
protocol [2] with the blockchain platforms as previously
presented [34]. The main idea is that one can issue transac-
tions with timestamp authority’s timestamped and signed
messages containing references to known blocks of the
blockchain. Then the time interval in which a given block
between two blocks containing timestamped messages can
be derived according to the order of the blocks. That
is, we insert anchor points with more accurate timing
information into the blockchain. A similar idea can be
applied to DAG-based systems like IOTA. One can insert
anchor points with reliable timing information and point-
ers to existing sites. However, this approach requires not
only anchor points but also weak freshness, which is not
provided by IOTA. Consequently, to what extent we can
improve the freshness property of IOTA is probabilistic in
nature which deserves further investigation.
Cryptographic Data Structures. Currently, most
blockchain technologies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum
attain their security properties in a decentralized way
at the cost of highly redundant and replicated data and
computation. However, storing all logged data on-chain
may be impractical, expensive, or undesired (for privacy
issues), and this issue calls for efficient cryptographic
data structures securely binding on-chain and off-chain
data that ideally fulfill the following properties: a) the
data structure can produce a “digest” with a fairly small
size from the ever-increasing log entries. b) From the
cryptographic data structure, the log server can efficiently
generate compact proofs with rich semantics (e.g., append-
only proof, (non)membership of objects). c) The proofs can
be verified by clients efficiently. d) The blockchain trans-
action model implies that any data on-chain is publicly
accessible. Therefore, it is desirable if the cryptographic
data structure facilitates the implementation of privacy
and access control policies in the system.
V. Conclusions
We conduct a study and survey of secure logging
systems based on blockchain technologies. The essential
properties for secure logging systems are identified and by
concrete examples, we show how the blockchain technology
is leveraged to fulfill these requirements. We also identify
several deficiencies of current systems, and make an initial
attempt to solve them. We signal further research that is
needed to better understand and resolve these deficiencies.
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